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Abstract
Recent events, such as the East Asian, Mexican, Scandinavian, and Argentinian crises, have
sparked considerable interest in exploring how shocks experienced by one country can spread vis-
à-vis real and nominal links to other countries’ banking systems. Given the large costs associated
with banking-system failures, both economists and policy-makers are interested in predicting the
onset of banking crises and assessing the likelihood of contagion during crisis events. The author
uses cross-country panel data to examine contagion across banking systems in developed and
developing countries. Particular attention is paid to the construction of the cross-country sample:
matching-method techniques are used to construct a suitable control-group sample analogue to
the set of crisis countries to accurately quantify the probability of the occurrence of a banking
crisis and the probability of banking-system contagion. The author ﬁnds that the sample choices
of previous studies introduced bias into the estimates of the probability that a banking crisis
would occur, owing to differences between the supports of the conditioning variables for the crisis
and non-crisis country groups. Furthermore, the probability of a banking crisis increases when
countries have macroeconomic characteristics similar to those that have recently experienced a
crisis, regardless of the degree of actual economic linkages between the countries. This suggests
that information contagion plays a larger role than previously suspected.
JEL classiﬁcation: F30, G20
Bank classiﬁcation: International topics
Résumé
Les événements récents, tels que les crises qui ont secoué l’Asie orientale, le Mexique, la
Scandinavie et l’Argentine, ont suscité un vif intérêt pour l’étude de la façon dont les chocs se
propagent d’un système bancaire à l’autre du fait des liens d’ordre réel ou ﬁnancier qui existent
entre les pays. Étant donné les coûts importants associés aux défaillances des systèmes bancaires,
les économistes tout comme les autorités cherchent à prévoir le déclenchement des crises
bancaires et à évaluer leur risque de contagion. Dans son étude, l’auteur examine la contagion au
sein des systèmes bancaires de pays développés et en développement à l’aide de données
longitudinales multipays. Soucieux de quantiﬁer avec précision la probabilité qu’une crise
bancaire survienne et qu’elle se propage d’un système bancaire à l’autre, il apporte un soin
particulier à la sélection de l’échantillon et utilise des techniques de rapprochement aﬁn de
constituer un groupe témoin analogue au groupe des pays victimes d’une crise. L’auteur constate
que, dans les études antérieures, le choix des échantillons introduisait un biais dans lesvi
estimations de la probabilité d’une crise bancaire parce que les supports des variables explicatives
n’étaient pas les mêmes entre les deux groupes de pays considérés. Il observe en outre que la
probabilité d’une crise bancaire augmente dans les pays dont les caractéristiques macroéconomiques
ressemblent à celles des pays qui ont récemment connu une crise, quelle que soit l’importance des
liens économiques réels entre ces pays, ce qui donne à penser que la contagion mimétique joue un
rôle plus grand qu’on ne l’avait d’abord soupçonné.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F30, G20
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Questions internationales 
1.  Introduction 
The role of central banks, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and national governments in 
preventing and  mitigating the  negative consequences of  banking  crises  and  “contagion”  is  a 
subject  of  ongoing  research  for  many  institutions.    Despite  considerable  efforts  to  model 
empirically the nature of banking crises, the results of current empirical analyses are not robust 
to alternative specifications.
1  Likewise, little is known with respect to the presence, and effect, 
of contagion across banking systems.  This paper seeks to answer the following questions left 
unanswered in the literature. First, given the limitations of the data, can the onset of a banking 
crisis  be  accurately predicted?  Second, does the theoretical  literature of  banking crises  and 
contagion provide suitable hypotheses that can be empirically tested?  And third, conditional on 
the ability to predict banking crises, can the existence of information contagion be assessed?   
That is, does the occurrence of a crisis in one market allow the prediction of crises in other 
markets, over and above the effects of macroeconomic interconnections? 
  The impetus for this research is clear: a recurring problem of financial markets throughout 
the  twentieth  century  was  their  tendency  to  experience  crises.    More  recently,  financial 
deregulation and the global  integration of  markets has  led to a heightened awareness of the 
potential fragility of financial systems in the face of crisis events.  Banking crises are numerous: 
Glick and Hutchinson (1999) document 90 banking crises since 1975 across a sample of 90 
developing  and  developed  countries.    High-profile  examples  of  banking  crises,  such  as  the 
Mexican, East Asian, Scandinavian, and Argentinian crises, reinforce this empirical reality.  The 
                                                 
1 The determinants of banking crises can vary widely, depending on sample choice and specification, resulting in 
different interpretations of the relevance of macro predictors across different empirical models. Given the current 
emphasis of the IMF and central banks on constructing “early warning systems” (EWS)  and “stress indicators” to 
quantify the potential risks in the financial system, it is important to be confident of the methods of empirical 
assessment used in these processes.   1 
very nature of banks renders crises more costly than for most other groups of firms.
2  Through 
payment  and  settlement  systems,  interbank  deposits  and  loans,  and  due  to  their  wide 
participation  in  financial  markets  as  market-makers,  the  failure  of  one  bank  can  affect  the 
liquidity and/or solvency of many market participants.
3  Banks are also potentially more fragile 
than other firms, since they can function only if depositors feel that their savings are safe.  This 
inherent  fragility  renders  banks  susceptible  to  deposit  runs,  both  within  and  across  banking 
systems.    
    The implications of the special nature of banking crises, and the potential for contagion to 
propagate their adverse effects, have not been ignored by policy-makers.  The recent East Asian 
crisis provoked considerable discussion about how to best design the global financial system to 
limit the scope and impact of any particular banking crisis.
4  This event also highlighted the fact 
that banking crises are often associated with currency crises, and that the combination of these 
two events can have serious macroeconomic consequences for the affected countries.  It is thus 
clearly  recognized  among  policy-makers  that  the  ability  to  predict  banking  crises  (and  the 
potential  for contagion)  is critical  for the  sound  management of the world  financial  system, 
particularly  in  light  of  continued  weakness  in  the  Japanese  banking  system,  high-profile 
corporate bankruptcies in the United States in the aftermath of the sharp decline in asset prices, 
and the operational risks associated with highly integrated markets.   
                                                 
2  The  potential  costs  of  banking  crises  are  large:    Frydl  (1999)  estimates,  for  a  sample  of  29  developed  and 
developing countries, the average cost of a banking crisis, in terms of lost output and resolution costs, to be over      
8 per cent of GDP, while Hoggarth, Reis, and Saporta (2001) use a sample of 24 countries and measure lost output 
at 15–20 per cent of GDP annually per crisis episode. 
3 The role of banks as intermediaries for savings also emphasizes their importance to the economy. 
4 During the East Asian crisis, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and the Phillipines all suffered banking 
crises.   2 
    This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 defines and describes contagion and how it 
can occur within and between banking systems.  Section 3 reviews the existing theoretical and 
empirical models of banking crises and contagion.  Section 4 discusses the empirical issues sur-
rounding existing empirical models of banking crises, paying particular attention to issues of 
functional form and sample selection.  Section 5 describes an empirical model of cross-country 
contagion and banking crises.  Section 6 offers data, descriptive statistics, and results, and it 
augments  the  empirical  analysis  by  using  matching  method  techniques.    Section  7  offers 
conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
2.   Defining Contagion
5 
 
Throughout the literature, the term contagion describes the process by which a crisis  in one 
market affects outcomes in financial markets, currency markets, and/or banking systems.  This 
section focuses on two definitions of contagion—fundamental and investor-based—and assesses 
how they can lead to banking crises. 
2.1   Fundamentals-based contagion   
Fundamentals-based contagion describes shocks that affect markets owing to economic  links   
The  term  covers  three  categories:  common  shocks,  trade  linkages,  and  financial  linkages 
(Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens 2000).  Crises can result from common shocks such as changes 
in U.S. interest rates, the price of oil, or the growth rate of the OECD countries, which can then 
lead to contagion due to the normal interdependence of economies.  Trade linkages can also be a 
pathway  for  contagion.    Because  a  crisis  affects  a  country’s  demand  for  imports,  exporting 
countries will be negatively affected by the new, lower level of demand.  Likewise, the crisis 
country may be forced to engage in a competitive devaluation, thereby affecting other exporting 
                                                 
5 This section draws heavily on Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000).    3 
countries.  Lastly, a crisis can affect other countries by reducing the direction and magnitude of 
capital flows.   In such cases, contagion is not caused by investor panic or herding, but by real-
side interdependencies.  The impact of such shocks can be contagious in that they undermine the 
quality of a bank’s loan portfolio through credit exposures, thus leading to insolvency if credit 
risks are not well-managed.  While fundamental contagion is seemingly very important, it has 
not been the focus of most studies.  It is relatively straightforward to anticipate the consequences 
that common shocks will have on the probability of a banking crisis occurring, or their effect on 
financial system fragility.
6  Of greater concern is when contagion is caused by factors other than 
fundamentals, since those shocks are less likely to be anticipated, and their negative impacts are 
more difficult to assess. 
2.2   Investor-based contagion 
The term investor-based contagion describes the process by which shocks that affect one market 
are transmitted to related markets despite the lack of actual fundamental relationships between 
the respective  markets.  Contagion  is transmitted by two primary channels: (i)  liquidity and 
incentives, and (ii) the sharing of information (Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens 2000).  In the 
former case, shocks to one market can cause a decline in asset prices, which, in turn, can have 
implications  for other  markets.  This  is particularly true for banks that utilize Value-at-Risk 
models, where there can be balance-sheet effects (Schinasi and Smith 2000).  A decline in one 
market’s asset prices may lead the bank to reduce its overall exposure to similar assets with 
correlated outcomes.  For instance, if an emerging economy experiences a banking crisis that 
causes the asset prices for that country to fall, a bank’s Value-at-Risk model may require similar 
                                                 
6 That is, the effect of a recesssion on banking systems is well-known and supposedly accounted for by regulatory 
capital requirements, due diligence, and credit-rating agencies.  Normal banking-system stress due to the business 
cycle is not a primary concern of the banking-crisis and contagion literature.   4 
type  assets  to  be  sold  off  from  the  portfolio.
7    This  balance-sheet  effect  may  lead  to  a 
deterioration in the prices of assets held in countries which are not experiencing a crisis, but 
which appear to be similar to the crisis country.  In this way, a banking crisis in one country 
could lead to a crisis in another country.   
The information-driven channel of investor-based contagion results from the fact that the 
onset  of  a  crisis  in  one  market  may  lead  investors  to  reassess  the  risks  associated  with 
investments in other markets.  This “visible similarity” contagion is also known as the “wake-up 
call,” and is often characterized by “herding” behaviour (Ahluwalia 2000).
8  Given that there is 
imperfect information in asset markets and assuming a fixed cost to collecting information, small 
investors may be forced to follow the actions of a few large (and seemingly well-informed) 
investors (Agenor and Aizenman 1997).
9  Thus, the arrival of information regarding a crisis in 
one country may lead to wake-up calls in similar countries.  This would lead to behaviour that 
would induce asset prices to fall in the affected countries, thereby undermining banks’ balance 
sheets.  While such behaviour may be collectively irrational, individual rationality implies that 
the crisis event could lead to contagion. 
2.3   Banking contagion within and across countries 
In spite of the independence of a failing bank, there are three main pathways by which its (or a 
banking system’s) failure can affect other banks.  First, other banks can be affected through 
exposures in payment systems, otherwise known as systemic risk.
10  For instance, the failure of a 
bank that participates in a payments system can lead to liquidity problems for banks that did not 
                                                 
7 For instance, a fall in the price of Brazilian debt may lead the bank to reduce its exposure to Mexican debt. 
8 While herding may seem irrational at the macroeconomic level, for the individual, such behaviour may be rational. 
9 Alternatively, since many large investors are managed by agents who face mean-performing incentives, the desire 
to replicate the actions of others may lead to herding behaviour. 
10 The relative importance of each channel naturally varies from country to country.  Nevertheless, given the ever-
increasing integration of financial markets, each pathway is important in its own right.   5 
receive expected payments in a timely fashion.  Banks that face such liquidity shortages could 
then be forced to withhold repayments themselves, leading to further liquidity shortages and 
ultimately to insolvency.  Given the wide participation of banks in multiple payments systems 
both domestically and internationally, the potential for contagion associated with systemic risk is 
substantial.     
Second, bank failures can be transmitted through banks’ exposures to each other in the 
interbank market, in which banks that are short on liquidity borrow from those that have excess 
liquidity, often on an overnight basis.
11  Interestingly, the vast majority of interbank lending is 
conducted on a non-collateralized basis.  Consequently, the failure of a bank to either repay an 
interbank loan or to extend credit to meet the liquidity needs of another bank through interbank 
lending could quickly lead to insolvency.  Given the large volumes of funds that are exchanged 
on interbank markets, there is considerable potential for contagion to occur.  Therefore, if a crisis 
that occurs in one country affects the willingness of banks to extend interbank credit, liquidity 
problems, and ultimately insolvency, can occur.
12 
Third, the failure of one bank can cause agents to reassess (accurately or not) the viability 
of other banks.  This pathway of information contagion can be considered the typical “bank-run” 
episode that was more a feature of the 1930s than of modern-day banking crises.  The idea that 
one  bank  failure  can  reveal  information  about  other  potential  bank  failures  should  not  be 
dismissed, however, since the potential impact of “herding” behaviour based on information can 
be significant in financial markets.  In this instance, no actual linkage between banks or banking 
                                                 
11 The size and scope of the international interbank market is impressive.  Bernard and Bisignano (2000) estimate 
total interbank claims at over $6.5 trillion. 
12 Specifically, there is anecdotal evidence that the Asian crisis was largely the result of the withdrawal of funds by 
Japanese banks from the interbank market that had transferred liquidity to East Asian banks.  As Thailand fell into 
crisis, other banks reconsidered their interbank exposures, and adjusted their portfolios accordingly (Bernard and  
Bisignano 2000).   6 
systems is required: rather, banks may be subject to runs simply due to their apparent similarity 
to a set of banks that have experienced a crisis.  
The  existence  of  multiple  channels  of  contagion  increases  the  probability  of  any 
particular shock having widespread consequences on banking-system stability.  That is, both real 
shocks and shifts in investor sentiment can generate effects that cause individual banks to fail, 
and the interdependence of banks can lead to further transmission (or amplification) of these 
shocks.  Furthermore, the linkages through which contagion between banks can occur exist not 
only at the national level but also at the international level.  Section 3 briefly reviews how the 
theoretical and empirical literature has attempted to address these issues.  
3.    Literature Review 
 
3.1   Theoretical models of banking crises and contagion 
While  there  are  numerous  theoretical  models  of  banking  crises,  dating  from  Diamond  and 
Dybvig’s (1983) seminal work, there are few corresponding theoretical models of contagion and 
banking crises, from either a domestic or international perspective.
13  The most notable example 
of contagion literature is Allen and Gale (2000).  Utilizing a standard Diamond and Dybvig 
framework where depositors consist of two types—those with early and those with late liquidity 
preferences—they show that, when banks are spatially separated, the existence of idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks will lead to the rise of an interbank market.  Assuming that there is no aggregate 
liquidity risk, the interbank market will ensure that regional liquidity shocks will not cause any 
bank to fail.  Regardless of the nature of interbank linkages, optimal risk-sharing through the 
interbank market will occur and shocks will not lead to contagious events.   
                                                 
13  See  Lai  (2002)  for  a  complete  survey  of  the  banking-crises  literature.  Typically,  most  models  of  contagion 
describe a domestic banking sector, but extension to an international setting (for spatial models) is conceptually 
straightforward.   7 
  In their study, Allen and Gale (2000) then introduce a zero-probability aggregate liquidity 
shock.    Contagion  can  occur  in  this  environment,  since  banks  suffer  unanticipated  liquidity 
shocks that cannot be insured against in the interbank market.  The liquidity shock can cause one 
bank to fail, which implies that its obligations in the interbank market will not be honoured, 
leading to a liquidity shortage for its counterparties.  This liquidity shortage can then spill over to 
the affected bank’s counterparties, as it fails to meet its interbank obligations.  The essential 
feature of the Allen and Gale model is that the effect of contagion depends entirely on market 
structure,  which  is  exogenously  determined.    If  interbank  markets  are  “incomplete,”  then 
contagion  will  be  limited  to  banks  in  the  immediate  region  of  the  failing  bank.    Greater 
completeness,  however,  means that while the chances of contagion are  higher (in that  more 
banks will suffer liquidity shocks), the chances of a bank failure are lower, since the shock is 
spread across more banks.   
  Alternatively, Chen (1999) provides an example of how the arrival of new information 
can lead to contagion in interbank markets.  In his model of informational contagion, there are 
multiple  banks that  invest  in risky  projects, and  investments are positively  correlated across 
banks.  Some depositors observe perfectly the outcome of their own bank’s risky project.  In a 
subset of banks, when depositors observe the failure of the risky project, they run on their banks.  
Depositors at other banks, some of whom are uninformed, run on their own bank, since they 
believe the bank’s risky project to be unsuccessful.  Thus, contagion can occur even without 
direct linkages between banks or banking systems.  The relative lack of theoretical modelling of 
banking  crises  and  contagion  is  not  surprising,  since  crises  are  difficult  to  model  as  an 
equilibrium  outcome.
14    In  fact,  Allen  and  Gale  (2000)  need  to  impose  a  zero-probability 
                                                 
14 Rochet and Tirole (1996) are another notable example.  In their model, contagion is viewed as a disciplining 
device, and as a result it is hard to draw testable predictions.   8 
aggregate liquidity shock and an exogenous interbank market structure to generate contagion.  
Consequently,  few  models  can  adequately  explain  why  contagion  occurs  across  and  within 
banking systems. 
3.2  Empirical  models of banking crises and contagion 
Substantial empirical literature seeks to determine whether banking crises can be characterized 
and/or predicted.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 1998, 2002), Eichengreen and Rose 
(1998), Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), Glick and Hutchinson (1999), Hardy and Pazarbasioglu 
(1998),  Kaminsky  and  Reinhart  (1998),  and  Hernandez  and  Valdes  (2001),  among  others, 
provide mixed evidence for the determinants of banking crises.  The potential usefulness (and 
motivation) of these studies is obvious: if the conditions under which banking crises occur can be 
established using widely available macroeconomic data, then policy-makers can take appropriate 
preventative actions.
15   
  Standard empirical models of banking crises utilize cross-country macroeconomic panel 
data to assess the determinants of the onset of a crisis event.  Data are typically gleaned from the 
IMF’s  International Financial Statistics (IFS), World Economic Outlook (WEO), and similar 
cross-country data sources. Early studies (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache 1997) use small samples of 15–40 countries, while more recent studies (Glick and 
Hutchinson 1999) include up to 90 countries.  Common to all studies is the underlying empirical 
relationship, which is defined as follows: 
        it it it X F Crisis e b + = = ) ( ) 1 ( Prob ,               (1) 
where Crisisit is a bivariate variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a banking crisis and 0 
otherwise, and Xit is a matrix of macroeconomic indicator variables, often current or lagged.  
                                                 
15 The IMF has developed the EWS based largely on this approach.   9 
Studies  include the real GDP growth rate, current account (or proxies, such  as the terms of 
trade), government deficit, inflation rate, real interest rates, measures of credit growth, reserves, 
and other indicators of oncoming financial stress.  Studies also include institutional information, 
such  as  the  level  of  accounting  standards,  legal  standards  and/or  the  existence  of  deposit 
insurance, or recent financial liberalization.  Estimation typically uses a simple probit or logit 
technique. 
  The  results  of  these  studies,  while  not  uniformly  robust,  provide  a  few  stylized 
relationships.  Banking crises are related to slow economic growth, high  inflation, high real 
interest rates, declining terms of trade, poor legal and accounting standards, and lower per-capita  
income.  With respect to institutional features, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002) 
find that deposit insurance is positively related to banking crises, as is financial liberalization.  
The  results  of  these  studies  have  important  policy  implications,  since  the  underlying 
relationships can be (and are) used to generate “stress” indexes.
16 
  The  treatment  of  contagion  in  the  empirical  literature  mirrors  its  exposition  in  the 
theoretical literature.  While numerous studies estimate the likelihood of banking crises, few, if 
any, examine the existence of contagion.
17  Several studies have tried to simulate the occurrence 
of contagion by assessing the  impact of the  failure of a bank  in the payments system.  For 
instance, Furfine (2001) uses Fedwire data to show how the failure of the largest bank(s) in the 
payments system would affect the liquidity position of its counterparties.  Upper and Worms 
(2000) conduct a similar analysis using simulated interbank exposures in the German banking 
system.  They estimate the optimal exposure of interbank market participants and  simulate the 
                                                 
16 The estimates of the coefficients can be used to generate the “weights” of the components of a stress index. 
17 There is considerable empirical literature on the incidence of contagion in financial markets and with respect to 
currency crises.  See Rigabon (2001) for a standard treatment.   10 
effect  of  a  failure  of  the  largest  interbank  participant.
18  The  striking  result  of  both  these 
simulation studies is that it is difficult to induce large-scale contagious banking failures through a 
default in the payments system or interbank market.  With a different approach, using aggregate 
bank  data  on  bank  capital  flows,  Van  Rijckeghem  and  Weder  (2000)  provide  evidence  that 
banking crises in one country predict capital flows to other countries.  They show that the onset 
of a crisis affects the flow of capital to other countries if those countries share common lenders.  
Van Rijckeghem and Weder, however,  do not extend the analysis to predict the occurrence of 
banking crises per se through contagion.  Before an empirical model of contagion is described, a 
close examination of the econometric shortcomings of banking-crises studies will highlight the 
difficulties associated with this type of analysis. 
4.    Econometric Issues: Are Existing Empirical Methodologies Sound? 
 
4.1   Defining a banking crisis 
The first issue is to define the term banking crisis.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) 
define the term to mean that the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets is greater than       
10 per cent, rescue operations cost more than 2 per cent of GDP, and/or the nationalization of 
banks  occurs,  or  a  bank  holiday,  or  a  guarantee  of  deposits.
19    Alternatively,  Caprio  and 
Klingebiel (1999) use loan losses and the erosion of bank capital to define a banking crisis.  
Other studies simply combine these definitions (for instance, Glick and Hutchinson 1999).  In 
either case, banking crises are defined as  binary variables,  indicating that there  is a discrete 
difference  or  some  threshold  value  that  differentiates  a  crisis  from  a  non-crisis  situation.
20  
However,  most  studies  (as  does  this  one)  conduct  sensitivity  analysis  and  the  results  are 
                                                 
18  Their  study,  however,  relies  upon  strong  assumptions  with  respect  to  market  structure  (since  it  cannot  be 
observed).   
19 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) vary the magnitudes but find little difference. 
20 It could be the case that small changes in the threshold levels would produce widely differing results.     11 
generally robust to reasonable definitions of what constitutes a crisis (as opposed to just normal 
variation  around  the  business  cycle).    While  sensitivity  analysis  to  different  definitions  of 
banking crises is important, it is not the focus of this study. 
4.2   Functional form 
A more pressing concern for this paper is the sensitivity of the results to the choice of functional 
form.  Given that there are typically few actual crisis events, the results may be affected by 
whether  one  utilizes  probit,  logit,  or  panel-data  techniques.    For  instance,  inappropriate 
assumptions over the distribution of the error term may lead to incorrect assessments of the 
likelihood of default.  That is, there may be country-specific effects that are unobservable in the 
data: if these effects are not controlled for, then the estimates of the coefficients may be biased if 
the unobserved country-specific effect is correlated to observables.  Therefore, a probit random-
effects specification may be warranted.  In this framework, the underlying assumption is that 
there is a randomly distributed error component, vi (that is uncorrelated with the X’s), in addition 
to the individual-error component.  Specifically, the random-effects model is: 
        it it it X F Crisis e b + = = ) ( ) 1 ( Prob ,               (2) 
 where the error term has two components: 
                 
￿
it = vi + uit , 
with  i n being  a  specific  individual  effect  and  uit  a  random-error  term.  The  error  terms  are 
normally distributed with zero means and are independent.  Therefore, normalizing 
2
u s : 
          [ ] 1 Var
2 2 2 + = + = v u v it s s s e , 
and  










r e e .   12 
If  the  random-effects  model  is  true,  then 
￿ ,  defined  as  the  proportion  of  the  total  variance 
contributed by the country-level variance component ( ) 1 (
2 2 + = v v s s r ), should be significantly 
different  from  zero.    Failure  to  control  for  this  country-specific  effect  will  result  in  biased 
estimates of the coefficients.
21  In this context, the error component vi will capture country-level 
unobservables such as risk type or bank supervisorial competence.  The assumptions necessary 
for  panel-data  techniques  to  be  consistent  may  not  be  met  in  this  environment.    Under  the 
random-effects  model,  if  i n is  correlated  with  the  regressors,  then 
￿   will  be  inconsistent 
(essentially,  this  is  equivalent  to  an  omitted-variables  problem).    If,  however,  the  data  are 
sufficiently rich, then the random-effects model is feasible if the random effect is orthogonal to 
the regressors.
22  This paper will estimate a random-effects model in addition to the standard 
probit technique.  The feasibility of applying panel-data techniques, and the appropriate test of 
orthogonality, will be addressed in future research. 
4.3   Sample selection  
Criticism  of  the  banking-crisis  literature  centres  on  (and  legitimately  so)  the  issues  of  data 
quality, the definition of banking crises, and the question of which set of macro variables best 
quantify impending banking-system stress.
23  The issue of sample selection is largely ignored.  
Early studies, such as Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1998), used only 20 countries, all of which had a 
crisis.  If it is believed that there are country-specific fixed effects that affect the probability of 
having  a  crisis,  then  this  approach  will  produce  biased  results—the  regression  is  essentially 
estimating the probability of having a crisis, conditional on having a crisis.  More recent studies, 
                                                 
21 An alternative approach to the random-effects model is the logit fixed-effects model.  The difference between 
these two models is largely “heuristic,” since it amounts to believing whether the unobserved individual effect is a 
shift in the intercept or a difference across coefficients (Greene 2000). 
22 Fortunately, the orthogonality assumption can be tested using a simple Hausman test.  See Greene (2000) for 
details. 
23 These shortcomings are widely acknowledged by the authors of these studies.   13 
such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), expand their sample to include countries that 
have not experienced a crisis.  The addition of a “control group” is critical to produce unbiased 
estimates  of  the  coefficient  vector.    Subsequent  studies  following  Demirgüç-Kunt  and 
Detragiache (1997), such as those by Glick and Hutchinson (1999) and Eichengreen and Arteta 
(2000), include all countries for which data are available. 
  Simply  adding  as  many  control  countries  as  possible  may  not  lead  to  more  accurate 
estimates of the determinants of banking crises, since it must be considered whether the control-
group countries are actually comparable to the crisis countries.  For instance, in Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1997), the list of countries in the control group may seem arbitrary.  While the 
authors acknowledge the need to exclude certain countries on the basis that they may be not be 
comparable to the countries studied (such as some transition economies), this process  is  not 
formalized.  Does including Togo and Seychelles as “control” countries make sense when the set 
of countries experiencing crises consists of OECD members and the emerging economies of East 
Asia?   
  The importance of choosing an appropriate control sample should not be underestimated.  
Heckman et al. (1996) show that the utilization of standard estimation techniques can produce 
biased estimates  if the distributions of the characteristics of the treatment group and control 
group are not over the same interval and exhibit dramatically different densities when they do 
share values.  For example, Heckman et al. show that, when evaluating the impact of job-training 
programs on labour-market outcomes, it is important to ensure that the control group is “similar” 
to the treatment group.   It could be the case that the individuals who take up the program are 
young females with high levels of education, and that the non-participants are old males with low 
levels of  human capital.  Thus, estimating the average  impact of the program across groups   14 
would not produce accurate estimates, since the program would have widely different effects for 
each group.  In terms of the banking-crisis literature, whether the crisis countries are sufficiently 
similar to the control group in terms of their characteristics must be considered.  That is, do the 
respective  countries  in  the  crisis  and  control  groups  share  similar  institutional  and 
macroeconomic features that would render them comparable when exposed to a shock that could 
induce a banking crisis?  If the latter group is not sufficiently “close,” then estimation may be 
biased.  To address this issue, this paper will utilize matching methods to construct a suitable set 
of control-group countries. 
4.4   Matching methods 
The non-experimental estimation techniques typically used in the banking-crisis literature rely on 
the fact that the crisis and control groups are comparable and imply common supports for the 
distribution  of  country  characteristics.    In  particular,  many  banking-crisis  studies  assess  the 
impact  of  particular  country-level  institutional  features  on  the  probability  of  a  crisis.    For 
example,  to  examine  the  impact  that  the  implementation  of  deposit  insurance  has  on  the 
probability  of  a  banking  crisis,  as  in  Demirgüç-Kunt  and  Detragiache  (2002),  a  standard 
treatment-effects  model would estimate the difference  between deposit  insurance participants 
and non-participants: 
        ) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 = - = = DI C E DI C E a .                      (3) 
Where C1 is the outcome of some crisis variable when the treatment is taken up, and C0 is the 
outcome of some crisis variable when the treatment is not taken up, deposit insurance DI= 1 if 
the country is “eligible” to take up the treatment and 0 otherwise.  Controlling for self-selection 
would help to reduce the potential bias from endogenous placement into the treatment group (in 
this case, taking up deposit insurance).  The estimated effect of deposit insurance, however,   15 
would still be biased, since equation (3) estimates the impact between all those who took up the 
program and all those who did not. To accurately assess the impact of deposit insurance, the 
effect of the treatment (deposit insurance) on the treated (those who could implement deposit 
insurance) must be calculated.  That is, 
        ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 = - = = DI C E DI C E T a .                    (4) 
Unfortunately, the second term on the right-hand side of equation (4) does not exist in the data, 
since it is not observed.  We do not observe those countries that were “eligible” to take up the 
treatment  but  declined  to  do  so.    Ideally,  the  researcher  could  create  ( ) 1 | 0 = DI C E   by 
implementing  a  randomized  experiment:  some  countries  would  randomly  introduce  deposit 
insurance, while others randomly  would  not.  If this were true, a true control-group sample 
analogue could be created and used to determine the difference between the outcomes of those 
countries  that  implemented  deposit  insurance  and  those  countries  that  did  not.    While  the 
implementation of randomized experiments has been successfully executed in certain settings, 
evaluation  techniques  of  this  sort  are  not  readily  accepted  by  development  practitioners  to 
evaluate the impact of deposit insurance. 
  A solution to this evaluation problem is to create the counterfactual ) 1 | ( 0 = DI C E  by 
matching treatment and control countries along  observable characteristics. If there are  many 
dimensions along which to match countries, however, the dimensionality of the match becomes 
very large, and it becomes difficult if not impossible to find matches.  Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983)  show  that  the  probability  that  the  country  participated  in  deposit  insurance  can  be 
matched along P(X) rather than along X, and consistent and unbiased estimates of the effect of 
deposit insurance on the treated country can still be produced.  The aim of matching is to ensure 
that the characteristics of the treatment group are similar to those of the control group.  To   16 
quantify whether matching is necessary, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) measure the differences 
between the two groups utilizing the “standardized difference.” The standardized difference in 
per cent is the absolute value of the mean difference as a percentage of the average standard 
deviation:  
        Std Diff =  ( ) ( ) [ ]
2 / 1 2
2
2
1 2 1 2 / / 100 s s x x + -  , 
Where, for each variable, x1 and x2  are the sample means in the treated group and the control 
group, and 
2
1 s  and 
2
2 s  are the corresponding sample variances.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
suggest that, if the standardized difference is greater than 10, then there is covariate imbalance 
and matching is required.  Similarly, it is possible to compare the kernel density of the respective 
distribution of characteristics between the treatment and control group.
24  If the two distributions 
do not share common supports or similar densities, estimation of treatment effects will produce 
biased results.  
  Several  methods  of  matching  can  be  considered:  “without  replacement,”  “with 
replacement,” and nearest-neighbour techniques (Dehejia and Wahba 1998).
25  For the purposes 
of this study, matching is done with replacement.
26  The ability of matching method techniques 
to  construct  a  suitable  control-group  sample  analogue  depends  on  the  following  crucial 
assumption: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , | 1 , | 0 0 = = = DI X P C E DI X P C E .                  (5)                
That  is,  conditional  on  the  propensity  score,  the  outcome  in  the  non-participation  state  is 
independent of participation.  The conditioning variables  must determine participation  in the 
treatment such that the outcome in the non-participation state is the same for participants and 
                                                 
24 Kernel densities are approximations of the distribution f(x) of the data. 
25 See Appendix A for a description of these techniques. 
26 For a description of the trade-off between the three techniques, see Dehejia and Wahba (1999).   17 
non-participants.  For this result to hold, Smith and Todd (2001) suggest that the data must 
possess two criteria.  First, the data for the control and treatment group must come from the same 
source; second, the data must be “sufficiently rich” that equation (5) holds true.  The limitations 
of matching methods are a function of these conditions.  In particular, the matching technique 
relies heavily on the second criterion, the availability of a rich set of conditioning variables.  The 
ability to create suitable counterfactuals to the treatment group depends on the ability to match 
along  observable  characteristics.    If  the  process  of  selection  into  the  participation  and  non-
participation states is a function of unobservables that are not captured by the observable data, 
then the control group may not be properly specified.  In this sense, the limitation of utilizing the 
propensity score as a measure of “comparability” is determined by the availability of sufficient 
conditioning variables.  If the decision to participate in the program is poorly measured, the 
treatment and control groups will be poorly matched, and any inferences on the effect of the 
“treatment on the treated” will be biased in an undetermined manner.  In this way, matching may 
actually accentuate the biases caused by selection on unobservables (Smith and Todd 2001). 
If the observable data sufficiently determine participation, then the benefits of matching 
are large.  By reducing the dimensionality of the match to a univariate measure, for each country 
in the treatment group its sample analogue can be generated in the control group.  Matching 
methods allow for a straightforward assessment (along P(X)) to determine whether the supports 
of the distribution of the control-group characteristics are different from those of the treatment 
group.  Those countries in the control group that fall outside the support of the treatment group 
are discarded from the sample.  Likewise, treatment-group countries that have no comparable 
control-group analogues are removed from the assessment procedure, since no counterfactual 
exists.  In this way, the most directly comparable control-group sample analogue is utilized in   18 
assessing the impacts of deposit insurance participation.   Matching, in theory, allows the effect 
of the treatment to be isolated. 
Although this study is not directly interested in evaluating the effect of deposit insurance, 
accounting standards, financial  liberalization, or other policies per se on the probability of a 
banking crisis occurring, the underlying premise of constructing a suitable control group based 
upon this type of criteria is still relevant.  To properly assess the likelihood of a banking crisis, it 
must be ensured that the control group is properly specified.  This study introduces matching 
method techniques to (i) assess whether the control groups suggested by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache  (1997)  are  suitable  and,  if  they  are  not,  (ii)  construct  a  control-group  sample 
analogue.    Section  5  describes  the  results  from  the  application  of  matching  methods  to the 
sample of treatment and control groups, and it also describes the standard descriptive statistics 
and regression results. 
5.    Theoretical  Predictions  and  Testable  Hypotheses:  Constructing  an 
  Empirical Model of Banking Crises and Contagion 
 
Chen’s (1999) theoretical model suggests possible candidate empirical tests of  banking crises 
and informational contagion.
27  The key to this test is that measures of real linkages between 
banking systems need not be found.  Rather, Chen suggests that “information”  may be sufficient 
to cause a banking crisis.  For instance, if a banking system fails, it may cause uninformed 
investors in another country to reassess the viability of their own (or other) banking systems, 
since they may believe that there is a positive correlation between the loan portfolios of the 
respective banking systems.
28 Subsequently, they will run on their own banking system, despite 
the non-existence of any real-side connections to the initially failing banking system. In terms of 
                                                 
27 The theoretical model of Allen and Gale (2000) does not lend itself well to empirical tests.  See Appendix B for a 
description of possible empirical tests of their model. 
28 The existence of correlated projects across banks (or, in this case, banking systems) is an assumption of the 
model.   19 
testable implications, this suggests that if two banking systems belong to economies that share 
similar characteristics, then the occurrence of a crisis in one system may predict the occurrence 
of the crisis in the other system, even if there are no real linkages between the markets.  This test 
can be implemented by augmenting the benchmark model of banking crises (1) with a proxy of 
informational contagion: 
        it it it it CT X F Crisis e b + + = = -1 ) ( ) 1 ( Prob ,             (6) 
where the Xs are the standard macroeconomic variables and CTit-1 is a proxy for informational 
contagion. The measure of “informational contagion” can be defined, as suggested by Ahluwalia 
(2000), by the following contagion index: 
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1 1 ] ) ( ) ( [ ,                    (7) 
 
where j indexes the non-crisis country, m indexes all the countries other than j, i indexes the 
macro variable from a set of K macro variables, Xijt are macro fundamentals for the year t,  jt X is 
the threshold value of X, I is an indicator function that takes a value of one if the argument 
jt ijt X X >  and  im imt X X > is true, and CRImt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the country experiences a banking crisis in period t.
29  The indicator variable determines whether 
the macro variable takes a value greater than some threshold value that would indicate that a 
crisis  is  occurring.    In  this  case,  whether  the  variable  is  one  and  a  half  or  more  standard 
deviations greater than its mean is the measure of a “crisis” value for that variable.
30  The crisis 
index adds a value of one if the non-crisis country shares a crisis indicator in common with the 
crisis  country.    Thus,  if  there  are  four  countries  in  crisis  with  a  macro  variable  above  the 
                                                 
29 This analysis can be extended to consider the effect of currency crises.  
30 For variables where low values are a sign of crisis, we assume that the indicator function includes a “less than” 
operator.  Varying the threshold does not qualitatively affect the results. Utilizing 1.5 standard deviations as the 
threshold level generates stress for 3–7 per cent of the total observations. 
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threshold and country j’s macro variable is also above the threshold, then CTjt takes a value of 
four.  Alternatively, one can define the contagion index as: 
            ) ( ) (
10
1 1 im imt ij ijt i
n
m mt jt X X I X X I CRI I CTM > ´ > ´ =￿ ￿ = = .           (8) 
Instead of counting the number of countries that are similar, CTMjt counts the number of macro 
variables  greater  than  the  threshold  that  country  j  has  in  common  with  any  country  that  is 
experiencing a crisis at time t.  In both cases, the contagion index captures the notion of the 
visible similarities of the non-crisis country to the crisis country.  If these visible similarities 
provoked investor-based contagion, one would expect the probability of a crisis to be higher in 
the next period if the contagion index takes values greater than zero. 
  Both indexes can be refined to capture visible similarities that are related to income or 
region. For instance, CTjt and CTMjt can be refined to count values only when country j is in the 
same income group as the crisis country, or the same region:  Thus, 
              ￿ ￿ = = > ´ > ´ ´ =
n
m i im imt ij ijt mt jt X X I X X I I DR CRI CTR
1
10
1 ] ) ( ) ( [ ) ( ,          (9) 
where  DR  takes  a  value  of  one  when  countries  m  and  j  belong  to the  same  region,  and  0 
otherwise. For instance, if Mexico experienced a crisis and its real interest rate was more than 
one and a half standard deviations above its mean, then, for any country in the region that also 
had real interest rates above the threshold, that value of CTR would also take a value of one.  
Similarly, CTIjt and CTMIjt are contagion indexes where countries are identified not by region 
but by income quartile:   
      ￿ ￿ = = > ´ > ´ ´ =
n
m i im imt ij ijt mt jt X X I X X I I DR CRI CTI
1
10
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DR takes a value of 1 if countries m and j both come from the same income quartile. For this 
study, CTIjt and CTMIjt are also calculated for when CRI is a dummy variable indicating the 
occurrence of a currency crisis. 
  The  intuition  underlying  the  contagion  indexes  is  simple:  if  a  country  experiences  a 
banking  crisis,  investors will  be  “woken up” and prompted to reassess the  viability of their 
portfolios in countries that share similar traits.  If countries share “visible similarities,” this will 
cause banks or other market participants to adjust their portfolios accordingly.  This could lead to 
a decline in asset prices, withdrawal of interbank deposits and loans, or other effects that would 
undermine the viability of the non-crisis country’s banking system and increase the likelihood of 
a banking crisis in the near future.  Interestingly, this analysis precludes the need for any change 
in fundamentals (although they are controlled for the regressions).  That is, if contagion occurs 
simply due to the effect of the crisis occurring, and not due to a change in fundamentals, then 
informational contagion potentially exists.   
6.  Results 
6.1   Data 
The data used in the study are taken from the IFS, WEO, and other IMF databases.  Over 90 
countries have sufficiently complete data from 1975 to 1998.  The banking and currency crisis 
dates are taken from Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and Glick and Hutchinson (1999), 
respectively.  The explanatory variables for predicting a crisis are those suggested by Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and are as  follows: GDP growth rate, current account surplus, 
depreciation rate of the currency, real interest rate, inflation rate, government deficit, ratio of 
M2/reserves, ratio of private credit-to-GDP, growth of real private credit, per-capita  income, 
existence  of  deposit  insurance,  and  a  measure  of  law  and  order.    The  predicted  signs,  as   22 
suggested by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, are as follows.  Poor macro fundamentals will 
adversely affect bank balance sheets negatively: low real GDP growth, declining current account 
balances, and high real interest rates should be positive predictors of a crisis.  High inflation and 
currency  depreciation  will  lead  to  a  higher  likelihood  of  banking  crises,  as  will  larger 
government deficits.  The former implies higher nominal interest rates and, in general, economic 
mismanagement,  while  the  latter  reduces  the  ability  of  the  government  to  address  banking-
system problems.  To control for liquidity, the ratio of M2-to-reserves is also included, since 
lower  liquidity  implies  a  greater  likelihood  of  default.    Conversely,  excessive  credit  growth 
implies overlending (often associated with real-estate booms) and thus should predict banking-
system distress.  Lastly, institutional variables should be taken into account.  Higher per-capita 
GDP and law and order imply a smaller probability of a banking crisis.  However, the sign for 
deposit insurance is not clear.  While it should reduce the likelihood of a bank run, insurance 
could  induce  moral-hazard  problems.    This  would  lead  to  riskier  lending  and  thus  a  higher 
likelihood of a banking crisis.  Appendix C gives a detailed description of these variables. 
  The  above  specification  naturally  raises  many  questions  regarding  the  problem  of 
underidentification.    While  macroeconomic  variables  are  important  indicators  of  possible 
banking-system stress, they are by no means the only determinants, since the likelihood of a 
crisis  depends  upon  many  typically  unobservable  characteristics.  These  would  include  bank 
industry-level  loan-loss  indicators,  Value-at-Risk  measures,  and  other  measures  of  financial 
fragility.  Institutional features such as the degree and effectiveness of bank regulators are also 
omitted.    Likewise,  it  is  difficult  to  measure  the  pathways  that  would  lead  to  informational 
contagion, since the effect of contagion depends on the degree of interconnectedness between 
respective  banking  systems.    To  quantify  this  effect,  it  would  be  necessary  to  observe  the   23 
existence, breadth, and depth of interbank markets, whether asset markets and banking systems 
are connected through institutional investors, and so on.  Consequently, in the empirical analysis 
that follows, it must be remembered that measures of contagion, which may show the existence 
of  the  pathway,  are  but  one  step  towards  understanding  how  contagion  can  affect  banking 
systems. 
6.2   Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 lists sample statistics for those countries that suffered a crisis at some time during the 
sample period, and for those that did not.  Several important characteristics stand out.  Over the 
time frame of the sample, countries experiencing banking crises had a greater depreciation of 
their  currency  (relative  to  the  dollar),  higher  inflation,  and  larger  government  deficits.    In 
addition, crisis countries had, overall, lower private credit-to-GDP, per-capita income and lower 
levels of law and order.  The contagion index was constructed as per Ahluwalia (2000) using the 
nine macro variables identified in section 6.1.  Overall, 6.4 per cent of all country-years had a 
contagion index score of 1 or more (results not shown) with respect to banking crises (CRI = 1 if 
a banking crisis occurs).  The contagion indexes were also constructed using currency crises for 
the dummy variable CRI – 7.3 per cent of all country-year observations having a contagion index 
score of 1 or more for currency crises. 
6.3  Matching methods 
Table 1 also lists measures of sample matching through the standardized difference of the crisis 
and control groups.  Following Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) rule of thumb, if the standardized 
differences are greater than 10, then there exists covariate mismatch that may lead to bias in the 
estimated coefficients.  Column 3 of the table shows that the standardized differences are large: 
the crisis and non-crisis countries are significantly different in terms of many of the explanatory   24 
variables, such as depreciation,  inflation, and other  measures.   To correct for this potential 
source of bias, matching methods are utilized.  The difficulty is that it is not obvious which 
characteristics are most appropriate to match.
31  
  For the purposes of this study, two criteria for matching are considered: (i) a measure of 
financial liberalization, and (ii) whether the country takes a positive value of the contagion index.  
The  motivation  for using  financial  liberalization (although other candidate  matching criteria, 
such as a binary financial development measure are possible) is twofold—it indicates a level of 
financial development and it is empirically related to the onset of financial crises (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache 1998).
32  First, a probit regression is estimated (see Table 2 for results), 
and then each crisis country-year is matched to its nearest neighbour from the non-crisis country-
year, based on its propensity score for financial liberalization.  The full set of available countries 
is  used  in  the  probit  regression  and  the  process  is  done  “with  replacement.”    Financial 
liberalization is predicted using the level of GDP, the level of openness, exports, and a variety of 
institutional variables.  The key identifying variable is legal origin—if the country does not have 
U.K. legal origin, financial liberalization is well-predicted.
33   
  The  second  matching  criterion  is  whether  the  country  takes  a  positive  value  of  the 
contagion index.  In that case, the contagion index can be considered to be the “treatment.”  The 
contagion  index  is  predicted  using  the  levels  of  macroeconomic  variables  and  regional  and 
income-level dummies.  These last two variables help to identify the contagion index directly, 
but are at the same time exogenous (in that countries do not choose their region nor their relative 
income, at least over the short run).  The objective of the matching process is to attempt to isolate 
                                                 
31 Typically, in the labour literature, the dependent variable of the probit regression used in generating the propensity 
score is program participation. 
32 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) argue that liberalization and deregulation initially leads to overlending, as 
inexperienced bank managers underestimate risk. 
33 This variable is used in other studies as an “instrument” for financial development (Ragan and Zingales 1998).     25 
the effect of the “treatment”—in this case, the occurrence of a banking crisis in a country with 
visible similarities.  Table 1 shows results of the matching exercise; in most cases, the degree of 
covariate imbalance is mitigated by the matching process.  Figures 1 to 4 show kernel density 
estimates  for  the  distribution  of  three  macro  variables  and  the  propensity  score  of  financial 
liberalization  for  unmatched  and  matched  data.    Matching  has  two  effects  that  are  readily 
discernible.  First, the distributions are more closely matched in terms of the kernel density.  For 
instance, in the case of per-capita GDP, private credit to GDP, and the propensity score, the 
matched control group’s kernel estimate distribution is more similar to the crisis group than to 
the  control  group  from  the  unmatched  data.    Second,  as  in  the  case  of  the  macro  variable 
“Government Surplus/GDP,” the supports of the distribution are closer than the unmatched data.  
This is not surprising, given the characteristics of the countries that are removed from the control 
group.  Matching by financial liberalization (or by contagion crisis index) removes Paraguay, 
Jamaica, Bahrain, Syria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Seychelles, and Togo.   
Consequently,  one  would  expect  the  remaining  control-group  countries  to  be  better 
“matched” to the crisis countries.   One problem that remains to be addressed is whether there is 
a sufficiently large pool of control-group countries.  Presumably, as the time frame enlarges, 
almost all of the countries could experience a banking crisis, thus removing them as potential 
control-group candidates.  The purpose of matching, however, is to generate a control-group 
sample analogue for a given sample of countries over a given time period.  In this way, matching 
formalizes the process by which countries are chosen, given the sample at hand. 
6.4   Regression results 
Table 3 lists the results of estimating the simple banking-crisis equation.  Banking crises are 
more  likely to occur during periods of slow economic growth, high  inflation, and  high real   26 
interest rates and fiscal laxity, although this last measure is not statistically significant (column 
1).
  34  Inclusion of credit and money variables does not significantly alter the results.  High 
private credit-to-GDP ratios and credit growth are positively related to banking crises (column 
2).  These two measures imply that the credit growth associated with booms may eventually lead 
to a crisis.  Unfortunately, the coefficients for the credit and money variables are insignificant.   
Although the lack of significance for  the depreciation rate and credit and money variables may 
seem troubling, it is not surprising given the nature of the data.  The high  variance, and the fact 
that  many  of  these  macro  variables  are  jointly  determined,  reduces  the  likelihood  that  any 
particular measure will be well-identified.
35  For instance, depreciation and the inflation rate are 
highly correlated, and so it is problematic to identify empirically  one effect from the other.    
Inclusion of institutional characteristics does not alter the results (columns 3 and 4).  The model 
is re-estimated utilizing a probit random-effects model.  The results do not change, however, and 
one cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
￿  = 0.  This suggests that country-specific effects are 
adequately controlled for by the inclusion of institutional variables. 
  The regressions are re-estimated with matched data to check the robustness of the results 
(Tables 4 and 5).  The macro variables retain their magnitude and significance, but there are 
several notable differences.  First, the coefficient on per-capita GDP is a significant predictor of 
a banking crisis, as is the size of the government deficit.  The benefit of matching can be seen 
through its impact on the precision of the estimates.  In this case, the matching process removes 
observations  from  the  data  that  do  not  share  similar  characteristics  with  the  control  group.  
                                                 
34 The use of current values (instead of lagged values) naturally raises the question of endogeneity.  Following 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) and Glick and Hutchinson (1999), however, current vales are used. 
35  This  is  also  reflected  in  the  low  pseudo  R
2  of  the  regression.    Banking  crises  are  essentially  micro-level 
phenomena, while the explanatory  variables are macro-level aggregates.  The subsequent mismatch in the data 
renders any close association unlikely. 
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Consequently, outliers are removed from the sample, leading to more reliable results.  While this 
result  could  be  achieved  by  simply  removing  outliers  arbitrarily,  matching  formalizes  the 
process.
36 
    The  incidence  of  contagion,  conditional  on  fundamentals,  is  assessed  by  estimating 
equations (9) and (10) with the inclusion of the contagion index, lagged one period, as suggested 
by Ahluwalia (2000).    If contagion exists, conditional on fundamentals, the coefficient should 
be positive and significant.  Table 6 lists the results.  The contagion index positively predicts 
future banking crises when the previous crisis event was a banking crisis from a country of a 
similar income group (columns 1 and 2).  This result did not hold when the contagion index was 
constructed  by  region,  or  when  the  contagion  index  was  based  on  previous  currency  crises 
(columns 3-8).  It could be the case, however, that the contagion index is simply picking up the 
fact  that  in  the  previous  period  the  defaulting  country’s  macro  variables  were  above  their 
threshold.  As a check, lagged dummies (taking the value of one if the macro variable was above 
the threshold) were added to control for this effect; the contagion index was still significant 
(results not shown).  The results hold when matched samples are used (Tables 7 and 8).  The 
banking  contagion  index  is  a  positive  predictor  of  the  occurrence  of  a  banking  crisis.  
Interestingly, the contagion index based upon currency crises is not a significant predictor of 
future banking crises. 
 
 
                                                 
36 The results shown in Table 1 suggest that sample selection may be important, since there is a large degree of 
covariate imbalance. While matching served to mitigate this problem, there still exists some degree of differences 
between the “treatment” group and the “control” group.  These differences exist partly due to the ad hoc nature of 
the matching process.  That is, the need to use macro variables to predict a country’s status in the control and 
treatment group is a shortcoming that is difficult to address.  Consequently, while matching did serve to produce 
better estimates of the probability of a banking crisis, this line of empirical research still requires further study.   28 
7. Conclusion 
This  paper  has  surveyed  the  empirical  literature  of  banking  crises  and  highlighted  several 
econometric  weaknesses.    Most  notably,  the  need  to  consider  the  choice  of  control-group 
countries has been shown to affect the estimation of the determinants of banking crises. The 
empirical evidence shows that the ability to predict banking crises may depend on the choice of 
the sample of  non-crisis countries:  failure to construct a suitable control group of  non-crisis 
countries can lead to biased results.  For instance, although the government surplus was not an 
important determinant of a banking crisis for the unmatched sample, a result that is consistent 
with  Demirgüç-Kunt  and  Detragiache  (2002),  the  matching  results  revealed  that  large 
government deficits are correlated to banking crises.    
  An empirical model was described of information contagion based upon Chen (1999).  
The  empirical  evidence  indicates  that  information  contagion  may  play  an  important  role  in 
predicting future banking crises.    Interestingly, it is only the occurrence of a banking crisis that 
leads to information contagion; currency crises do not provoke contagious banking-crisis events.  
This is consistent with previous evidence that suggests that banking crises and currency crises 
are either concurrent events or that currency crises are preceded by banking crises (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart 1999b).  While this evidence is far from conclusive, it suggests future avenues of 
research.  Most  notably,  are  the  results  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  measures  of  financial 
integration?  Potential candidate control variables could be gleaned from BIS exposure data, or 
based on whether a country’s banks have exposures to the interbank markets, payments systems, 
or  other  forms  of  banking-system  integration.    Better  identification  of  the  contagion  effect, 
however,  is  not  possible  until  the  degree  of  banking-system  integration  is  controlled  for.  
Consequently, there is still considerable room for future research.   29 
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Table 1: Country Characteristics  
 
                  Mean        Mean       
      Mean    Mean        (control group      (control group     
      (crisis    (control group  Standardized   matched by  Standardized   matched by  Standardized 
Variable      countries)   unmatched)  difference  contagion index)  difference  fin lib index)  difference 
 
Growth        3.4    3.3    3.27    3.8    9.59    3.3    2.99   
 
Current account/GDP    -0.022    -0.026    3.85    -0.028    5.80    -0.029    6.74   
 
Depreciation      0.113    0.065    21.73    0.07    18.90    0.08    14.63   
 
Real interest rate     2.1    2.4    4.41    1.48    6.26    1.41    6.86   
 
Inflation       14.2    8.8    38.39    9.3    34.68    9.5    31.61   
 
Government surplus/GDP   -0.058    -0.042    11.14    -0.046    11.20    -0.069    9.54   
 
M2/reserves      13.82    11.39    12.05    9.82    21.90    17.09    12.23   
 
Private credit/GDP    0.39    0.46    27.02    0.45    21.28    0.44    19.68   
 
Cash/bank assets     0.113    0.101    10.18    0.115    1.28    0.124    6.74   
 
Real credit growth    6.83    1.48    7.41    3.25    15.88    5.36    19.21   
 
Ln per-capita income    7.80    8.44    43.21    8.22    27.27    8.18    38.65   
 
Deposit insurance    0.24    0.18    14.52    0.19    22.53    0.17    17.95   
   
Law and order      3.54    4.29    47.16    4.11    35.73    4.23    42.44   
 
The standardized difference in per cent is the absolute value of the mean difference as a percentage of the average standard deviation:  ( ) ( ) [ ]
2 / 1 2
2
2
1 2 1 2 / / 100 s s x x + -  where for each variable x1 and x2  
are the sample means in the treated group and the control group and  
2
1 s  and 
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Table 2: Probit Regression 
 
Dependent Variable:           
        Financial    Crisis 
        liberalization    event  
        (1)      (2)           
 
Growth        -0.001      -0.061*         
        (0.012)      (0.017)         
Current account/      1.762      -1.809*         
  GDP        (0.6323)     (0.789)         
Depreciation      -0.246      0.107         
        (0.235)      (0.297)         
Real interest rate     0.030*      -0.002         
        (0.007)      (0.009)         
Inflation       0.015*      0.001         
        (0.006)      (0.006)         
Government       -0.111      -0.437         
   surplus/GDP      (0.356)      (0.394)         
 
M2/reserves      -0.111      0.005*       
        (0.356)      (0.003)       
Private credit/       0.022      0.528*       
   GDP        (0.233)      (0.295)       
Real credit growtht-2    0.001*      0.001       
        (0.000)      (0.001)       
 
 
Legal origin      -0.620*      -0.004 
        (0.102)      (0.151) 
Deposit insurance    0.597*      0.101         
        (0.142)      (0.178)   
[Poor excluded] 
High income       -0.581*      -0.643   
        (0.189)      (0.403)   
Middle income      -0.451*      -0.106   
        (0.153)      (0.266)   
Low income      -0.430*      0.029   
        (0.121)      (0.189)         
 
Chi
2          196.47      57.22           
Pseudo R
2      0.18      0.11           
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Table 3: Probit Results–Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis 
 
        Macro    Banking   Institutional  Institutional   
        variables  variables  characteristics  characteristics   
        (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
 
Growth        -0.049*    -0.057*    -0.058*    -0.063*       
        (0.022)    (0.025)    (0.025)    (0.025)       
Current account/       0.142    0.480    0.165    0.545       
  GDP        (0.785)    (0.698)    (0.636)    (0.662)       
Depreciation      0.375    0.270    0.194    0.236       
        (0.205)    (0.397)    (0.415)    (0.415)       
Real interest rate     0.021*    0.017*    0.020*    0.018*       
        (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)       
Inflation       0.009*    0.009**   0.010*    0.008**      
        (0.004)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)       
Government       -0.477    -0.393    -0.638    -0.291       
   surplus/GDP      (0.487)    (0.537)    (0.589)    (0.527)       
 
M2/reserves          0.001    0.004    0.001       
            (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)       
Private credit/           -0.216    0.202    0.084       
   GDP            (0.313)    (0.398)    (0.396)       
Real credit growtht-2        0.002    0.002    0.001       
            (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.001)       
 
Ln per-capita               -0.147       
   income              (0.098)           
Deposit insurance                0.245         
                (0.214)           
Law and order                  -0.090     
                    (0.082) 
 
N        1138    915    905    905       
Chi
2          33.14    33.14    37.47    35.01   
Pseudo R
2      0.10    0.10    0.12    0.11   
 






Table 4: Probit Results–Matched Data (by Financial Liberalization) Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis 
 
        Macro    Banking   Institutional  Institutional             
        variables  variables  characteristics  characteristics       
        (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)       
 
Growth        -0.055*    -0.055*    -0.056*    -0.062*       
        (0.027)    (0.027)    (0.024)    (0.024)       
Current account/      0.263    0.293    0.162    0.360       
  GDP        (0.468)    (0.482)    (0.618)    (0.407)       
Depreciation      0.219    0.234    0.154    0.205       
        (0.420)    (0.401)    (0.424)    (0.424)       
Real interest rate     0.016*    0.014**   0.016*    0.015**      
        (0.007)    (0.006)    (0.008)    (0.008)       
Inflation       0.007**   0.008**   0.010**   0.008*       
        (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005)    (0.004)       
Government       -0.859*    -0.874*    -0.750    -0.691*       
   surplus/GDP      (0.211)    (0.244)    (0.585)    (0.279)       
 
M2/reserves          0.001    0.002    0.001       
            (0.004)    (0.005)    (0.004)       
Private credit/           0.074    0.594    0.492       
   GDP            (0.292)    (0.412)    (0.373)       
Real credit growtht-2        0.004    0.004    0.002       
            (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)       
 
Ln per-capita               -0.151           
   income              (0.096)         
Deposit insurance            0.194         
                (0.209)         
Law and order                  -0.114**       
                    (0.068)       
 
N        852    852    852    793       
Chi
2          62.68    66.24    35.51    59.32       
Pseudo R
2      0.09    0.10    0.12    0.12       
 










Table 5: Probit Results–Matched Data (by Crisis Event) Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis 
 
        Macro    Banking   Institutional  Institutional             
        variables  variables  characteristics  characteristics       
        (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)         
 
Growth        -0.055*    -0.055*    -0.056*    -0.058*       
        (0.026)    (0.026)    (0.026)    (0.027)       
Current account/      0.300    0.357    0.188    0.408       
  GDP        (0.480)    (0.454)    (0.446)    (0.394)       
Depreciation      0.306    0.310    0.245    0.293       
        (0.402)    (0.389)    (0.426)    (0.405)       
Real interest rate     0.017*    0.017*    0.019*    0.018*       
        (0.07)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)       
Inflation       0.008**   0.008*    0.010*    0.008*       
        (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005)    (0.004)       
Government       -0.754*    -0.742*    -0.588*    -0.627*       
   surplus/GDP      (0.228)    (0.266)    (0.268)    (0.289)       
 
M2/reserves          0.003    0.003    0.003       
            (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)       
Private credit/           -0.061    0.438    0.237       
   GDP            (0.297)    (0.374)    (0.380)       
Real credit growtht-2        0.002    0.002    0.001       
            (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.002)       
 
Ln per-capita               -0.157**         
   income              (0.082)         
Deposit insurance            0.258         
                (0.179)         
Law and order   
                    -0.081     
                    (0.067)       
 
N        845    845    845    779       
Chi
2          46.31    55.05    54.13    49.82       
Pseudo R
2      0.10    0.11    0.12    0.12       
 






Table 6: Probit Results–Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis 
 
      CTI    CTMI    CTI    CTMI    CTR    CTMR    CTR    CTMR 
      banking   banking   currency   currency   banking   banking   currency   currency 
      (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)   
 
Growth      -0.052*    -0.053*    -0.058*    -0.058*    -0.056*    -0.059*    -0.062*    -0.062*   
      (0.025)    (0.025)    (0.025)    (0.025)    (0.025)    (0.025)    (0.025)    (0.025)   
Current account/    0.255    0.209    0.206    0.159    0.307    0.230    0.210    0.212   
  GDP      (0.651)    (0.645)    (0.600)    (0.620)    (0.643)    (0.627)    (0.625)    (0.625)   
Depreciation    0.225    0.213    0.210    0.191    -0.059    -0.081    -0.106    -0.100   
      (0.425)    (0.424)    (0.418)    (0.416)    (0.509)    (0.496)    (0.492)    (0.495)   
Real interest rate   0.020*    0.020*    0.020*    0.019*    0.025*    0.024*    0.024*    0.024*   
      (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010)   
Inflation     0.010*    0.010*    0.010*    0.010*    0.018*    0.019*    0.019*    0.019*   
      (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.008)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)   
Government     -0.527    -0.563    -0.611    -0.643    -0.641    -0.741    -0.769    -0.764   
   surplus/GDP    (0.618)    (0.609)    (0.596)    (0.590)    (0.627)    (0.596)    (0.587)    (0.588)   
 
M2/reserves    0.003    0.003    0.004    0.005    0.004    0.005    0.005    0.005   
      (0.005)    (0.004)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)   
Private credit/     0.175    0.177    0.207    0.201    0.330    0.375    0.365    0.369   
   GDP      (0.406)    (0.402)    (0.400)    (0.400)    (0.416)    (0.410)    (0.412)    (0.410)   
Real credit growtht-2  0.002    0.002    0.002    0.002    0.002    0.002    0.002    0.002   
      (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)   
 
Ln per-capita     -0.154    -0.153    -0.149    -0.148    -0.166**    -0.164    -0.159    -0.159   
   income    (0.096)    (0.098)    (0.099)    (0.098)    (0.099)    (0.101)    (0.103)    (0.103)   
Deposit insurance  0.261    0.262    0.249    0.244    0.222    0.204    0.202    0.203   
      (0.211)    (0.213)    (0.214)    (0.213)    (0.216)    (0.219)    (0.218)    (0.218)   
 
Contagion index    0.345**   0.212**   0.106    -0.014    0.325    0.080    -0.235    -0.066   
      (0.197)    (0.118)    (0.242)    (0.129)    (0.199)    (0.140)    (0.361)    (0.221)   
 
N      905    905    905    905    893    893    893    893   
Chi
2        39.93    39.24    37.70    37.47    36.67    37.04    35.85    36.05   
Pseudo R
2    0.13    0.13    0.12    0.12    0.12    0.11    0.12    0.11 
   
 





Table 7: Probit Results–Matched Data (by Financial Liberalization) Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis 
 
      CT    CTM    CT    CTM    CTR    CTMR    CTR    CTMR 
      banking   banking   currency   currency   banking   banking   currency   currency 
      (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)   
 
Growth      -0.050**    -0.052**    -0.056**    -0.056*    -0.050**    -0.054**    -0.057*    -0.057*   
      (0.028)    (0.028)    (0.028)    (0.028)    (0.027)    (0.027)    (0.027)    (0.027)   
Current account/    0.288    0.220    0.227    0.165    0.197    0.175    0.152    0.158   
  GDP      (0.449)    (0.451)    (0.406)    (0.450)    (0.432)    (0.450)    (0.478)    (0.471)   
Depreciation    0.174    0.153    0.175    0.152    0.184    0.159    0.144    0.147   
      (0.454)    (0.454)    (0.446)    (0.444)    (0.444)    (0.442)    (0.440)    (0.440)   
Real interest rate   0.017**   0.016**   0.017*    0.016*    0.017**   0.016**   0.016*    0.016*   
      (0.007)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.018)    (0.007)    (0.018)    (0.008)    (0.007)   
Inflation     0.010*    0.010*    0.009*    0.010*    0.010*    0.010*    0.010*    0.010*   
      (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)   
Government     -0.602*    -0.661*    -0.702*    -0.744*    -0.694*    -0.724*    -0.756*    -0.751*   
   surplus/GDP    (0.258)    (0.261)    (0.276)    (0.262)    (0.279)    (0.263)    (0.246)    (0.250)   
 
M2/reserves    0.001    0.001    0.002    0.002    0.003    0.003    0.002    0.004   
      (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.003)    (0.004)    (0.003)   
Private credit/     0.578    0.602**   0.609**   0.598    0.633**   0.621*    0.598    0.596   
   GDP      (0.361)    (0.360)    (0.367)    (0.369)    (0.362)    (0.362)    (0.366)    (0.367)   
Real credit growtht-2  0.003    0.003    0.003    0.003    0.003    0.003    0.004    0.004   
      (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)   
 
Ln per-capita     -0.160*    -0.162*    -0.155**    -0.153**    -0.167*    -0.161**    -0.151**    -0.151**   
   income    (0.076)    (0.078)    (0.082)    (0.080)    (0.074)    (0.077)    (0.080)    (0.080)   
Deposit insurance  0.214    0.213    0.199    0.194    0.204    0.194    0.190    0.192   
      (0.175)    (0.177)    (0.176)    (0.175)    (0.172)    (0.175)    (0.174)    (0.174)   
 
Contagion index    0.428*    0.246*    0.168    0.007    0.409    0.135    -0.160    -0.036   
      (0.191)    (0.105)    (0.205)    (0.083)    (0.271)    (0.143)    (0.332)    (0.194)   
 
N      851    851    851    851    851    851    851    851   
Chi
2        73.66    68.85    66.95    63.99    59.71    61.45    68.53    66.11   
Pseudo R
2    0.13    0.13    0.11    0.12    0.13    0.12    0.12    0.12   
 






Table 8: Probit Results–Matched Data (by Crisis Index) Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis 
 
      CTI    CTMI    CTI    CTMI    CTR    CTMR    CTR    CTMR 
      banking   banking   currency   currency   banking   banking   currency   currency 
      (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)   
 
Growth      -0.042*    -0.043**    -0.045**    -0.045*    -0.052*    -0.055*    -0.056*    -0.056*   
      (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.026)    (0.026)    (0.026)    (0.026)   
Current account/    0.253    0.200    0.174    0.130    0.207    0.191    0.150    0.166   
  GDP      (0.452)    (0.448)    (0.407)    (0.437)    (0.431)    (0.443)    (0.473)    (0.463)   
Depreciation    0.303    0.292    0.303    0.283    0.265    0.249    0.233    0.235   
      (0.410)    (0.408)    (0.409)    (0.406)    (0.429)    (0.427)    (0.424)    (0.425)   
Real interest rate   0.019*    0.019*    0.018*    0.018*    0.020*    0.020*    0.019*    0.019*   
      (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)   
Inflation     0.010*    0.010*    0.009*    0.010*    0.010*    0.010*    0.010*    0.010*   
      (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)   
Government     -0.555*    -0.602*    -0.674*    -0.702*    -0.565*    -0.584*    -0.613*    -0.608   
   surplus/GDP    (0.243)    (0.242)    (0.251)    (0.237)    (0.287)    (0.270)    (0.245)    (0.252)   
 
M2/reserves    0.003    0.002    0.004    0.003    0.003    0.003    0.004    0.003   
      (0.004)    (0.003)    (0.004)    (0.002)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)   
Private credit/     0.042    0.037    0.095    0.092    0.444    0.439    0.455    0.448   
   GDP      (0.384)    (0.381)    (0.374)    (0.371)    (0.379)    (0.375)    (0.368)    (0.367)   
Real credit growtht-2  0.003    0.003    0.003    0.003    0.002    0.002    0.002    0.002   
      (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.002)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)   
 
Ln per-capita     -0.109    -0.107    -0.103    -0.102    -0.165*    -0.159*    -0.155*    -0.155**   
   income    (0.078)    (0.080)    (0.082)    (0.081)    (0.078)    (0.080)    (0.081)    (0.081)   
Deposit insurance  0.277    0.273    0.265    0.260    0.264    0.258    0.255    0.257   
      (0.180)    (0.181)    (0.181)    (0.179)    (0.178)    (0.179)    (0.176)    (0.176)   
 
Contagion index    0.386**   0.226*    0.105    -0.009    0.236    0.033    -0.312    -0.120   
      (0.205)    (0.115)    (0.226)    (0112)    (0.243)    (0.124)    (0.326)    (0.202)   
 
N      845    845    845    845    845    845    845    845   
Chi
2        65.66    62,24    64.27    62.15    52.70    54.08    59.86    57.73   
Pseudo R
2    0.13    0.13    0.13    0.12    0.13    0.12    0.13    0.12   
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Kernel Density Estimate, Unmatched Data: Ln Per Capita GDP 
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Appendix A: Matching Methods 
 
The standard technique, matching without replacement, is conducted as follows.  First, 
run a logit and/or probit regression to generate a scalar measure of the probability of deposit 
insurance participation P(X).  Match each country in the treatment group to a control country, in 
descending order, and repeat until each treatment country is matched with a country from the 
control group.   
  This technique can also be done “with replacement.”  In this case, P(X) is estimated and  
the data are randomly ordered.  Then each country in the treatment group is matched with the 
country from the control group that is its nearest neighbour.  Define P(X) as p, C1 the set of 
treatment countries, and C0 the set of control countries.  Then, let C0(i) represent the set of 
control countries matched to the treatment country i given values of the propensity score pi.  
Matching to the nearest neighbour is done as follows: 
           j i j p p i C - = min ) ( 0 . 
That is, each treatment unit is matched to its closest sample analogue from the control group 
based upon the propensity score.  Furthermore, this technique implies that both the treatment 
units and control units will share common supports.  If a treatment country does not contain a 
comparable sample analogue in the control unit (and vice versa), the country is removed from the 
sample.  In this way, different treatment countries may have the same control-group analogue.  
Lastly, one can match each treatment country to those control countries within some radius, 
￿
, of 
P(X) and take the weighted average of the characteristics of those countries in the radius.
1  That 
is: 
                                                 
1 The size of 
￿  is determined by the researcher.  Likewise, one can use local linear regression or kernel estimator 
methods to generate the control group analogue within the range of 
￿ .   48 
          { } d < - = j i j p p p i C | ) ( . 
All the control units falling within the radius 
￿
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Appendix B: Market Structure (Allen and Gale, 2000) 
 
Allen and Gale (2000) show that the more complete the interbank market, the less likely a shock 
is to lead to contagion that causes a system-wide banking crisis. For example, consider two 
different market structures as shown in Figure B.1.  If a shock hits Bank 2, the likelihood that 
contagion  will  spread  differs  according  to  market  structure.    If  the  market  structure  is  less 
complete, as in structure A, the idiosyncratic liquidity shock will affect only one other bank, but 
with a greater likelihood that the other bank will become illiquid (since the shock can be insured 
only across two banks). The more complete the market structure, as in structure B, the greater the 
likelihood that the shock affecting Bank 2 can be insured against by the banking system.  There 
is a trade-off, however, since structure B could lead to a complete failure of the banking system 
in the presence of a very large liquidity shock, while the relatively incomplete market structure A 
will result in the failure only of two banks  The difficulty in testing these respective hypotheses 
from  the  Allen  and  Gale  model  is  that  it  is  hard  to  find  direct  empirical    measures  of 
“completeness.”  Conversely,  there  may  be  threshold  effects,  such  that  completeness,  while 
allowing  a  greater  dispersion  of  market  liquidity  when  required,  can  actually  help  transmit 
shocks.  Unfortunately, the data requirements for testing these hypotheses are  extremely high, 
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Appendix C: Description of the Explanatory Variables and 
Sources 
Data were obtained from the IMF and World Bank. 
Variable Name  Definition    Source 
 
Growth      Growth rate of GDP    IFS, WEO data base   
 
  Current account    Current account surplus    IFS  
 
Depreciation    Rate of change of the    IFS 
        exchange rate 
 
Real interest rate   Nominal interest rate    IFS   
minus the contemporaneous    
rate of inflation       
 
Inflation     Rate of change of inflation   IFS  
 
 
Surplus/GDP    Ratio of central      IFS 
        government budget  
        surplus to GDP 
 
M2/reserves                     Ratio of M2 to foreign    IFS 
         exchange reserves of the     
central bank       
 
Private credit/GDP  Ratio of domestic credit to   IFS 
the private sector to GDP     
 
Credit growth    Rate of growth of real    IFS 
        domestic credit 
 
Deposit insurance  Dummy variable for     Kyei (1995), Garcia (1999),  
        existence of a deposit     World Bank  
insurance scheme 
 
  Law and order    Quality of law enforcement  International Country Risk Guide, World  
                Bank  
 
 
Source: Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), IFS, World Bank 
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